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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
ALEX MONTIEL, : Case No. 20030310-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
INTRODUCTION 
Contrary to the State's arguments in its response to Alex Montiel's (Montiel) 
opening brief, Montiel's conviction should be reversed because the trial court abused its 
discretion by rejecting the proposed plea agreement. Further, even though Montiel 
properly preserved his claim for appeal, this Court should reverse regardless of 
preservation because the trial court's abuse of discretion was plain error and Montiel did 
not invite the error. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE MONTIEL'S CONVICTION 
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
REJECTING THE PLEA AGREEMENT 
Contrary to the State's argument, the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting 
the plea because: (A) it failed to consider all legally relevant factors, (B) it exceeded the 
scope of its authority, and (C) it applied its discretion arbitrarily. Moreover, this Court 
should reverse because the trial court's abuse of discretion was prejudicial. 
A. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing to Consider All Legally 
Relevant Factors, 
The trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider all legally relevant 
factors because: (1) although Utah law has not yet defined what legally relevant factors a 
trial court must consider before rejecting a plea, other jurisdictions agree a trial court 
must at least consider the plea under the circumstances of the case before rejecting it, and 
(2) the trial court did not consider the plea under the circumstances of Montiel's case 
before rejecting it, but relied instead on a fixed policy formed from personal bias. 
1. Although Utah Law Does Not Yet Define What Factors a Trial Court Must 
Consider Before Rejecting a Plea, Other Jurisdictions Agree a Trial Court 
Must At Least Consider the Circumstances of the Particular Case. 
As explained in footnote 2 of Montiel's opening brief and reinforced by the 
State's response, Utah law has not yet defined what factors a trial court should consider 
before rejecting a plea. See Aplt. Br. at 8 n. 2; Aple. Br. at 19-23.l Thus, Montiel's 
argument relies on case law from other jurisdictions for guidance. See Arndt v. First 
Interstate Bank of Utah . 1999 UT 91,Tfl7, 991 P.2d 584 (noting if Utah case law "is not 
determinative," then court must look to "case law from other jurisdictions for guidance"); 
1
 See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) (stating "court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty" 
without defining parameters of discretion); State v. Mane. 783 P.2d 61, 66 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) (holding court did not abuse discretion by rejecting plea after defendant 
testified "he had no memory" of his actions because "[n]othing in [Rule 11(e) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure] requires a court to accept a guilty plea and defendant has 
cited no case authority for that proposition")); State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13,^16, 
17 P.3d 1153 (stating, without defining parameters of discretion, trial court did not err by 
refusing to enforce plea and noting plea "failed to adequately address" restitution). 
2 
State v. Galvan, 2001 UT App 329,^12, 37 P.3d 1197 (turning to "other jurisdictions 
[that] have decided similar cases" because matter of first impression in Utah). 
In its response, the State argues case law from other jurisdictions is not helpful 
because there is no "list of factors" to consider before rejecting a plea that "enjoys 
universal acceptance." Aple. Br. at 23, 25. However, in the cases cited by the State and 
Montiel, one factor is universal—the trial court must exercise sound discretion, meaning 
it must consider the plea under the circumstances of the case before rejecting it. See 
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (holding trial "court may reject a plea 
in exercise of sound judicial discretion"); State v. Turner, 980 P.2d 1188, 1189-90 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998) (holding Utah courts "review a trial court's acceptance or rejection of a 
guilty plea under an abuse of discretion standard"); Black's Law Dictionary 479 (7th ed. 
1999) (defining judicial discretion as the "exercise of judgment by a judge or court based 
on what is fair under the circumstances and guided by the rules and principles of law").2 
2
 See, e.g.. United States v. Jeter, 315 F.3d 445, 447-48 (5 th Cir. 2002) (holding 
court did not abuse discretion by rejecting plea because could not assume state would 
prosecute and too lenient under circumstances and guidelines); United States v. Torres-
Echavarria, 129 F.3d 692, 696-97 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding no abuse because court found 
plea "inadequately reflected" seriousness of returning after deportation to violate law and 
undermined guidelines, and leniency previously encouraged defendant to violate law); 
United States v. Severino, 800 F.2d 42, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding court exercised 
sound judicial discretion by rejecting for no factual basis because defendant lied during 
plea hearing); United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 1458 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding 
court exercised reasonable discretion by rejecting because plea prevented prosecution of 
individuals for fraud against Government and severely limited fines); United States v. 
Moore, 637 F.2d 1194, 1196 (8 th Cir. 1981) (holding court must act within "scope of its 
broad discretion"); United States v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding no 
3 
Specifically, a trial court cannot reject a plea based on a fixed policy. See United 
States v. Robertson. 45 F.3d 1423, 1439 (10 th Cir. 1995) ("In our judgement, rejecting a 
plea implicating both branches of government solely out of concern for the district 
court's scheduling is, under the facts of this case, impermissible."); Hockaday v. United 
States. 359 A.2d 146, 148-49 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding "trial court must identify good 
reasons for" rejecting plea and "blanket refusal to hear from either side concerning the 
abuse because plea did not allow "sentence commensurate with" offense and dangerous 
character where defendant charged with house burglary at night while occupants asleep 
and had violent record); People v. Jasper. 17 P.3d 807, 812 (Colo. 2001) (holding court 
must exercise "independent judgement in deciding" each case); Daniels v. State, 453 
N.E.2d 160, 165 (Ind. 1983) (holding no abuse because court carefully considered 
evidence, was aware of victim's feelings, recognized arranging plea took time and effort, 
and was concerned with respecting statute); Stacks v. State. 372 N.E.2d 1201, 1207 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1978) (holding court must evaluate "circumstances of the case and determine 
the propriety of the particular bargain"); State v. Clanton. 612 P.2d 662, 665 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 1980) ("[J]udicial discretion implies the liberty to act as a judge should act, 
applying the rules and analogies of the law to the facts found after weighing and 
examining the evidence."); People v. Grove. 566 N.W.2d 547, 557 (Mich. 1997) 
(holding court may reject if plea is "'too light a sentence under the circumstances of the 
case'" (citation omitted)); Sparks v. State. 759 P.2d 180, 184 (Nev. 1988) (holding court 
must consider: "(a) fairness to the defense, such as protection against harassment; (b) 
fairness to the prosecution interest, as in avoiding a disposition that does not serve due 
and legitimate prosecutorial interests; (c) protection of the sentencing authority reserved 
to the judge" (emphasis omitted)); State v. Southworth. 52 P.3d 987, 997 (N.M. Ct. App. 
2002) (holding court may reject if plea is "'too light a sentence under the circumstances 
of the case'" (citations omitted)); State v. Hines. 919 S.W.2d 573, 578 (Term. 1995) 
(holding no abuse because court found facts, "even when mitigating circumstances were 
considered, should be decided by a jury"); State v. Reuschel. 312 A.2d 739, 743 (Vt. 
1973) (holding plea "should not be refused without good reason"); State v. Sears . 542 
S.E.2d 863, 867 (W. Va. 2000) (holding court must consider "in light of the entire 
criminal event and given the defendant's prior criminal record" whether plea allows court 
to dispose of case in manner commensurate with seriousness of charges and 
character/background of defendant). 
4 
proffered plea constituted an abuse of discretion" (citations omitted)); State v. Hager, 630 
N.W.2d 828, 833, 837 (Iowa 2001) (holding discretion to reject "is broad but not 
unlimited" and "refusing to consider the terms of the plea agreement solely because it 
was presented after the deadline" was abuse). In other words: 
Rule 11 permits district courts to assess the wisdom of plea 
bargains; this grant of power carries with it the duty to 
exercise it responsibly. When a court establishes a broad 
policy based on events unrelated to the individual case before 
it, no discretion has been exercised. When dealing with 
issues as fundamental as a person's freedom or imprisonment, 
our judicial system can-and must-give every case 
independent consideration. 
United States v. Miller. 722 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1983). Thus, this Court should 
reverse because the trial court did not consider the circumstances of Montiel's case but 
rejected the plea based on its fixed policy to never waive firearms enhancements. R. 
200:4-7; see Section I.A.2. 
2. The Trial Court Did Not Consider the Plea Under the Circumstances of 
Montiel's Case But Rejected the Plea Based On a Fixed Policy. 
The State argues the trial court did not abuse its discretion because it considered 
"alternative grounds for rejecting the plea." Aple. Br. at 14. Specifically, the State 
presents a list of factors it claims the trial court considered before rejecting the plea. IdL 
at 26-27. However, this list actually represents factors the trial court refused to consider 
under its fixed policy, factors not demonstrated by the record, and disguised restatements 
of the trial court's fixed policy. 
5 
First, the trial court did not consider the "prosecutor's concerns regarding the 
strength of his evidence11 or "defense counsel's reference to judicial economy." Aple. Br. 
at 26-27. Although the prosecutor repeatedly told the trial court he did not have enough 
evidence to guarantee a conviction, the trial court refused to consider this factor because, 
"Well, I don't waive firearms enhancements, folks. You plead them, they're stuck unless 
I'm convinced that there was some mistake in pleading." R. 200:4. Similarly, although 
Montiel told the trial court judicial economy favored accepting the plea, the trial court 
refused to consider this factor because, "I don't care about judicial economy when people 
are alleged to have used firearms." R. 200:5. 
Second, the trial court did not consider the "seriousness of defendant's crime" or 
whether the sentence was "commensurate to the charged crime." Aple. Br. at 14, 27. 
Montiel was charged with aggravated robbery with an enhancement for committing the 
offense with two or more persons. R. 4-5. Although possession of a firearm was one 
element of the charged crime and one circumstance of the alleged event, it was not the 
only element or circumstance. R. 4-5; see Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999) (listing 
elements of aggravated robbery); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999) (listing elements of 
robbery); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 2002) (listing elements of enhancement 
for committing crime in concert with two or more people). Thus, the trial court, to 
properly exercise its discretion, should have looked beyond the alleged firearm to 
consider the elements of the charged crime, the circumstances of the case, and Montiel's 
6 
character and history. R. 200:4-7; see Aplt. Br. at 9-14. 
Third, the trial court did not consider "the fact that the agreement reduced a first 
degree felony . . . to a third." Aple. Br. at 27. During the plea hearing, the trial court 
made no mention of the crime, let alone the degree of the crime. R. 200:4-7. He was 
concerned only with the firearms enhancement. IcL Had a gun not been alleged, the trial 
court would have been open to a plea and considered the details of the plea offered. Id. 
However, because a firearm was alleged and the trial court did not "waive firearms 
enhancements," the trial court was blinded to all other details of the plea. Id. 
Fourth, the trial court could not have considered the alleged victim's feelings 
because it did not know those feelings. Aple. Br. at 14, 27. Whether the victim 
approved of the plea is not clear from the record. R. 200:6-7. Although the prosecutor 
said he had spoken to the victim, the trial court prevented him from telling exactly what 
the victim felt and whether the victim approved of a plea akin to the current plea. Id . 
This Court should not infer from the absence of evidence that the victim did not approve 
of the plea. See, e.g., Tisco Intermountain & State Ins. Fund v. Industrial Comm'n, 744 
P.2d 1340, 1342 (Utah 1987) (holding "it cannot be assumed that facts exist" in the 
absence of evidence). Besides, even if this Court were to infer facts from the absence of 
evidence, the more logical inference would be the victim approved of the plea. See State 
v. Casey, 2002 UT 29, 44 P.3d 756 (holding victim's right, "[u]pon request, to be 
informed of, be present at, and to be heard at important criminal justice hearings" extends 
7 
to "change of plea hearing[s]" and "must be 'protected'" (citations omitted)). 
Fifth, the State's claim that the trial court considered the "lack of congruity 
between the prosecutor's claim that defendant 'is a dangerous person' [that] should be 
lock[ed] up' and the prosecutor's willingness to have defendant plead," confuses the 
record. Aple. Br. at 27. The prosecutor proposed the plea because of his belief that 
Montiel was a "dangerous person." R. 200:5-6. Specifically, the prosecutor accepted the 
plea because it was the only way to guarantee incarceration. IdL However, the trial court 
refused to consider this reasoning, regardless of the prosecutor's heightened involvement 
with the case, because it would not waive the firearms enhancement. IdL; see United 
States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1438 (10 th Cir. 1995) ("Courts do not know which 
charges are best initiated at which time, which allocation of prosecutorial resources is 
most efficient, or the relative strengths of various cases and charges." (citations 
omitted)); Sandy v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Ct . 935 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Nev. 1997) (same). 
Sixth, the "prosecutor's failure to persuade the court that 'there was some mistake 
in pleading' aggravated robbery" was not a factor considered but an ultimatum offered by 
the trial court. Aple. Br. at 26-27. The trial court said it would not waive "the firearms 
enhancement" unless "you can tell me you don't have any evidence . . . or there wasn't a 
firearm or your witness is lying." R. 200:5. This was not a guideline by which to 
conduct further plea negotiations, but a definitive ruling that there would be no plea. I(L 
at 4-5. When outlining the plea, the prosecutor made clear he had not made a mistake in 
8 
charging Montiel with use of a firearm and he did not believe his witnesses were lying. 
Id. Instead, he was proposing the plea because he did not have sufficient evidence to 
prove use of a firearm at trial. Id, Accordingly, by saying it would only waive a firearms 
enhancement if there was a mistake in pleading or no evidence to support the charge, the 
trial court made clear it would not consider a plea at all in this case. Id, at 4-7. 
R The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Exceeding the Scope of Its 
Authority. 
Although it recognizes a trial court abuses its discretion by "effectively nullifying 
the State's right to prosecute," Utah case law has not yet defined the scope of a trial 
court's discretion to reject a plea proposed and agreed to by the State. See Utah Const. 
Art. V, Sec. 1 ("The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into 
three distinct departments,. . . and no person charged with the exercise of powers 
properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any functions appertaining 
to either of the others."); Turner, 980 P.2d at 1190 (holding trial court abused discretion 
by accepting plea over State's objection because it "effectively nullified] the State's 
right to prosecute defendant"). Accordingly, Montiel looks to case law from other 
jurisdictions for guidance. Aplt. Br. at 14-21; see, Arndt, 1999 UT 91 at [^17 (noting if 
Utah case law "is not determinative," then court must look to "case law from other 
jurisdictions for guidance"); Galvan, 2001 UT App 329 at {^12 (turning to "other 
jurisdictions [that] have decided similar cases" because matter of first impression in 
Utah). Specifically, Montiel cites cases from jurisdictions that share Utah's interest in 
9 
protecting the State's right to prosecute. Aplt. Br. at 14-21. 
Contrary to the State's claim, the cases cited by Montiel, including United States 
v. Ammidown. 497 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973), do not dissolve the trial court's discretion 
to reject a plea. Aple. Br. at 32; see Ammidown, 497 F.2d at 621-22 (recognizing trial 
court may reject plea agreements according to its "reasoned exercise of discretion"). 
Rather, these cases, while recognizing the trial court's discretion in sentencing, also 
recognize the State's right to prosecute and the prosecutor's superior ability to "evaluate 
the government's prosecution resources and the number of cases it is able to prosecute." 
Ammidown. 497 F.2d at 621; see Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1438 ("Courts do not know 
which charges are best initiated at which time, which allocation of prosecutorial 
resources is most efficient, or the relative strengths of various cases and charges." 
(citations omitted)). Thus, these cases conclude separation of powers and judicial 
economy dictate that the trial court should follow the prosecutor's plea decisions "in the 
overwhelming number of cases." Ammidown, 497 F.2d at 621; Sandy, 935 P.2d at 1151 
(noting prosecutors have discretion to determine whether plea should be accepted due to 
"insufficiency of trial evidence, doubt as to the admissibility of certain evidence," "the 
need to bring another felon to justice," "uncertain success or conserving prosecutorial 
resources, or any other separate factor necessitating acceptance"). 
This reasoning directly comports with Utah's concern in preventing trial courts 
from using their discretion to "nullify[] the State's right to prosecute." See Turner, 980 
10 
P.2d at 1190; see Aple. Br. at 30 (recognizing "prosecutor has broad discretion" in the 
"decision to indict, allege specific charges, or dismiss charges" (quotations and citations 
omitted)). Accordingly, Utah, like other jurisdictions that protect the State's right to 
prosecute, should weigh the trial court's discretion to reject a plea against the State's 
right to prosecute when establishing the scope of a trial court's discretion. See United 
States v. Maddox. 48 F.3d 555, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding "judge must provide a 
reasoned exercise of discretion in order to justify a departure from the course agreed on 
by the prosecution and defense"); Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1439 ("[Rejecting a plea 
implicating both branches of government solely out of concern for the district court's 
scheduling is, under the facts of this case, impermissible."); United States v. Barker, 681 
F.2d 589, 591-92 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding prosecutor's "decision to negotiate a plea" falls 
within his "'discretion to decide not to pursue a particular prosecution any further'" 
(citation omitted)); United States v. Noble, 653 F.2d 34, 36 (1st Cir. 1981) (noting case 
where plea reached to ease impact of conviction distinguishable from Ammidown 
because, "This is not a case where acceptance of the plea agreement is both reasonable 
and necessary to secure a legitimate and important prosecutorial interest"); United States 
v.C.R. Bard Inc., 848 F. Supp. 287, 288 (D. Mass. 1994) (holding agreement reached 
by "capable counsel" "should be accepted if it is reasonable" or "unless there is good 
reason to reject it"); Hager, 630 N.W.2d at 834 ("Plea agreements are not solely within 
the realm of courts." (citations omitted)); Hockadav. 359 A.2d at 148 ("If no proper 
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cause exists to vitiate the plea, the trial court is obliged to accept it." (citation omitted)); 
Sandy, 935 P.2d at 1150-51 ("Judicial power to reject plea bargains serves to modify and 
condition the absolute power of the prosecutor, consistent with the doctrine of separation 
of powers, by establishing a check on the abuse of prosecutorial (executive) 
prerogatives." (citations omitted)); Sparks, 759 P.2d at 184-85 ("'The question is not 
what the judge would do if he were the prosecuting attorney, but whether he can say that 
the action of the prosecuting attorney is such a departure from sound prosecutorial 
principle as to mark it an abuse of prosecutorial discretion'" (citation omitted)). 
Besides, even if this Court does not follow the reasoning delineated by MontiePs 
cases, this Court should still reverse because the trial court exceeded the scope of its 
authority even under the test proposed by the State. Under the State's test, "'[p]lea 
bargains . . . go to the traditionally judicial function of determining what penalty to 
impose.'" Aple. Br. at 32 (citation omitted). Thus, the trial court's "'adjudicatory and 
sentencing responsibilities justify active scrutiny'" to determine whether the plea 
agreement provides "too light a sentence." Id. at 33 (citations omitted); see State v. 
Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1300 (Utah 1993) ("Sentencing should be conducted with full 
information and with careful deliberation of all relevant factors."). In this case, the trial 
court did not scrutinize the case at all, let alone actively scrutinize it. See. Section I.A.2; 
Aplt. Br. at 9-14. Rather, the trial court rejected the plea agreement based on its fixed 
policy to never waive firearms enhancements. Id 
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C The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Applying Its Discretion 
Arbitrarily. 
The State argues the trial court did not apply its discretion arbitrarily because the 
trial court considered all the factors previously listed in its "all relevant factors" section. 
Aple. Br. at 34-35; see Aple. Br. at 26-27. However, as previously shown, the trial court 
did not consider any of these purported factors. See Section I.A.2; Aplt. Br. at 9-14, 21-
24. Thus, because the trial court ignored the circumstances of Montiel's case and relied 
entirely on its personal bias against firearms to reject Montiel's plea agreement, it abused 
its discretion by rejecting the plea arbitrarily.3 R. 200:4-7; see Maddox, 48 F.3d at 558 
3
 In footnote 3, the State argues the trial court's policy "was not to 'never waive 
firearms enhancements,'" but to "waive them only if the prosecutor proffered that the 
enhancement was improperly charged or that the evidence was insufficient to support it." 
Aple. Br. at 35 n. 3 (emphasis added) (quoting Aplt. Br. at 23). However, the State's 
distinction is inaccurate. The trial court actually said it would waive a firearms 
enhancement only if "you don't have any evidence . . . or there wasn't a firearm or your 
witness is lying." R. 200:4-5 (emphasis added). If the trial court were willing to waive a 
firearms enhancement where evidence was merely insufficient, it would have at least 
listened to and considered the State's complaints of insufficient evidence in this case. IcL_ 
Moreover, the State's distinction is meaningless. In general, if there is a mistake in the 
information or there is no evidence to support the charges, the prosecution will not reach 
the plea agreement phase. See State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51,ljl5, 26 P.3d 223 
(holding at preliminary hearing, "'the prosecution must present sufficient evidence to 
support a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant 
committed it'" (citations omitted)). Similarly, here, the prosecutor made clear there was 
no mistake in the information and there was some evidence to support the charges. R. 
200:4-5. Accordingly, the trial court's statement that it would only consider waiving a 
firearms enhancement if there was a mistake in the information or no evidence to support 
the charge was simply a restatement that it would not waive firearms enhancements. See 
Section I.A.2. Besides, there are numerous reasons beyond sufficiency of evidence that 
justify a prosecutor entering a plea agreement. See. Sandy, 935 P.2d at 1151 (noting 
prosecutors may accept plea due to "insufficiency of trial evidence, doubt as to the 
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(holding, to act without arbitrariness, trial court "must provide a reasoned exercise of 
discretion in order to justify a departure from the course agreed on by the prosecution 
and defense" (quotations and citations omitted)). 
D. This Court Should Reverse Because the Trial Court's Abuse of Discretion 
Was Prejudicial. 
The State claims the proper test to determine prejudice where a trial court rejects a 
plea agreement is whether the defendant "'took any action in reliance on the tentative 
plea agreement' that 'would substantially affect' his trial." Aple. Br. at 36 (citing State v. 
Stringham. 2001 UTApp 13,ffl[15-16, 17P.3d 1153). However, in Stringham . this test 
was applied not to determine whether the defendant was prejudiced by the trial court's 
rejection of a plea but by his reliance on a plea that was never presented to the trial court 
for consideration and that the trial court was later "unwilling to compel the State to 
honor." See Stringham. 2001 UTApp 13 at^fl5 (citing State v. Moss. 921 P.2d 1021, 
1027 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)). Similarly, in Moss, this test was applied not to determine 
whether the defendant was prejudiced by the trial court's rejection of a plea but by his 
reliance on a plea that was illegally accepted. See Moss, 921 P.2d at 1027. In both of 
these cases, the defendants argued they were prejudiced by reliance on pleas they were 
not legally entitled to. See Stringham. 2001 UT App 13 at 1J15; Moss. 921 P.2d at 1027. 
admissibility of certain evidence," "the need to bring another felon to justice," "uncertain 
success or conserving prosecutorial resources, or any other separate factor necessitating 
acceptance"). 
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Accordingly, the test for prejudice necessarily measured their reliance on the unattainable 
pleas rather than on the erroneous denial of the pleas. Id. 
Alternatively, in this case, Montiel's plea agreement was legal and was agreed to 
by the State. R. 200:4. In other words, his prejudice resulted not from mistakenly 
relying on a plea he could not legally receive, but by being denied the opportunity to 
enter a legal plea simply because the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting the plea 
based on a fixed policy. IcL at 4-7. Accordingly, the test to determine if Montiel was 
prejudiced is whether, "[b]y proceeding with trial," he was "exposed to a greater possible 
punishment than that which could have resulted from his guilty pleas." Hockaday, 359 
A.2d at 149; see Maddox. 48 F.3d at 560 (same); United States v. Dele gal, 678 F.2d 47, 
52 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding argument that defendant was not prejudiced was "baseless" 
because he was "convicted of two counts" after the trial court rejected his plea to one 
count); cf. United States v. Shepherd. 102 F.3d 558, 563 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("Although 
'prejudice is more readily apparent where the rejection of the plea leads to conviction of 
a greater offense than that offered in a plea agreement,5 prejudice may still exist when the 
defendant is ultimately convicted of the same offenses to which she attempted to plead 
guilty." (citations omitted)). Thus, because Montiel was forced to go to trial for an 
enhanced first degree felony rather than pleading guilty to a third degree felony, he was 
prejudiced by the trial court's abuse of discretion. R. 172-73; 200:4; 201-03. 
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II. ALTHOUGH MONTIEL PROPERLY PRESERVED HIS CLAIM 
FOR APPEAL, HIS CONVICTION MERITS REVERSAL 
REGARDLESS OF PRESERVATION BECAUSE THE TRIAL 
COURT'S ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS PLAIN ERROR AND 
MONTIEL DID NOT INVITE THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROR 
This Court should not review Montiel's case for plain error because he properly 
preserved his argument for appeal. Moreover, regardless of preservation, this Court 
should reverse because the trial court's abuse of discretion was plain error and Montiel 
did not invite the trial court's error. 
A. Montiel Properly Preserved His Claim For Appeal. 
"The preservation rule serves two important policies." State v. Hoi gate, 2000 UT 
74,^11, 10 P.3d 346. "First, 'in the interest of orderly procedure, the trial court ought to 
be given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it.'" IdL. 
(citation omitted). "Second, a defendant should not be permitted to forego making an 
objection with the strategy of 'enhancing] the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, 
if that strategy fails,. . . claim[ingj on appeal that the Court should reverse.'" IJL 
(alterations in original) (citation omitted). Here, Montiel properly preserved his issue for 
appeal because both policy reasons behind the preservation rule are met. 
First, the trial court was repeatedly given the opportunity to address and correct its 
error. At the pretrial conference, the trial court, the State and Montiel engaged in an 
extended discussion about the plea agreement. R. 200:4-7. Initially, the State explained 
the details of the plea and said it agreed to the plea because the facts were not 
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"presentable to the jury." Id at 4. Immediately, the trial court ruled, "Well, I don't waive 
firearms enhancements, folks. You plead them, they're stuck unless I'm convinced that 
there was some mistake in pleading." Id. Defense counsel then alerted the trial court to 
the abusive nature of so hastily exercising its discretion by saying, "there's also the 
additional reason . . . judicial economy." IcL at 4-5. However, the trial court ignored this 
warning and said, "I don't care about judicial economy when people are alleged to have 
used firearms in the commission of a crime. . . . I'm not going to waive the firearms 
enhancement." Id, at 5. Next, the State urged the trial court to rethink its decision by 
explaining the district attorney authorized to accept guilty pleas had weighed the case and 
determined a plea was necessary to protect the public from "a dangerous person" and to 
fulfill the State's "duties to the taxpayers" because a plea was the only way, judging from 
the weakness of the evidence, to assure Montiel would be imprisoned. Id. at 5-6. 
Finally, the State began to explain the victim's feelings on the plea. IcL. at 6. However, 
before the State could convey the victim's feelings, the trial court interrupted to 
summarily conclude the State had not "even told the [alleged victim]" about the plea and 
to reiterate its ruling that it would not "accept any plea to a third-degree felony on the 
basis of what I've heard." Id. at 6-7. Accordingly, the trial court's abuse of discretion in 
refusing to consider the plea because of its blanket policy to never "waive firearms 
enhancements" resulted not from Montiel's failure to alert the trial court to its error but 
from the trial court's refusal to heed Montiel's and the State's repeated warnings. 
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Second, Montiel did not forego objecting to the trial court's abuse of discretion 
with the strategy of enhancing his chances of acquittal and then claiming abuse of 
discretion on appeal if his strategy failed. Utah courts "will not require a party to 
continue to object once a motion has been made, and the trial court has rendered a 
decision on the issue." State v. Hoffhine. 2001 UT 4,^14, 20 P.3d 265; cf. State v. 
Hansen, 2002 UT 114,1J20, 61 P.3d 1062 (holding "'defendant [is not required] to object 
or to renew his motion to suppress at trial where the trial judge is also the judge who 
ruled on the pretrial motion'" (citation omitted)). This is especially true where the trial 
court makes clear it will not reconsider its ruling. See State v. Chapoose, 1999 UT 
83,Tf8, 985 P.2d 915 (holding defendant did not invite error even though declined 
interview offered after evaluator reached conclusions because "once the evaluator was 
fully committed" the harm was done and the "only remedy was for [defendant] to obtain 
a fresh evaluation by another person" and the "only way to get that was to go through 
sentencing and then appeal, which he did"); J.W. v. State. 2001 UT App 208,^15 n. 4, 30 
P.3d 1232 (holding sufficiency argument preserved because both parties argued evidence 
during closing, trial court made finding, and "any further objections or motions regarding 
this issue would have been futile"); Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. v. Crook , 2000 UT App 
217,^14, 6 P.3d 1143 (holding no need for party to move to dissolve where "it would 
have been duplicative, costly, and probably futile"); cf State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96,^ f34, 
989 P.2d 52 ("'"The failure of counsel to make motions or objections which would be 
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futile if raised does not constitute ineffective assistance.'"" (citations omitted)). 
Here, the trial court made clear it would not reconsider its fixed policy and stated 
it would not accept a plea f,[u]nless you can tell me you don't have any evidence . . . or 
there wasn't a firearm or your witness is lying."4 R. 200:5, 7. Thus, even though the 
State believed its evidence was too weak to prove guilt, it could offer no plea that would 
overcome the trial court's fixed policy against waiving firearms because it had some 
evidence to show use of a firearm and it did not believe the witnesses were lying. IdL_ at 
4-6. In other words, Montiel was not required to continue seeking a plea agreement 
because his efforts would have been futile. See Section I.A.2; supra note 3. Besides, 
there is no evidence to suggest Montiel, by later seeking a dismissal when the State failed 
to present evidence against him, harbored a hidden strategy to forego pleading guilty. 
See Aple. Br. at 11-12; R. 201:4-13; Hoffliine. 2001 UT 4 at Tfl4 (holding defendant did 
not invite error by saying he "was not concerned" about challenged evidence after trial 
court ruled it admissible). Further, no inference of a hidden strategy can be drawn 
because, regardless of the possibility of a plea, a defendant is always entitled to request a 
dismissal when the State fails to produce evidence against him. See State v. Smith, 2003 
4
 The State argues the trial court's statement, "I'm not going to accept any plea to 
a third-degree felony on the basis of what I've heard," was an invitation to the parties to 
"revisit" the plea because the trial court "would reconsider its ruling if either party cared 
to present additional argument." Aple. Br. at 11. However, a trial court does not invite a 
party to make additional arguments every time it says "on the basis of what I've heard." 
On the contrary, this statement can also signify, as it did here, a definite ruling that "on 
the basis of what I've heard" there is not enough evidence to grant a plea. R. 200:4-7. 
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UT App 52^32, 65 P.3d 648 ("The State's failure to present evidence to satisfy this 
necessary element of the offense would have entitled [defendant] to a dismissal on that 
count." (citation omitted)), cert, granted. 76 P.3d 691 (Utah 2003); State v. Kihlstrom. 
1999 UT App 289,lf8, 988 P.2d 949, cert, denied . 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000) ("If the 
prosecution has failed to present sufficient evidence to support its case, the trial court 
should dismiss."). In fact, it would constitute deficient performance if defense counsel 
did not move to dismiss when the State failed to present evidence against his client. See 
Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.3 comment ("A lawyer should act with commitment and 
dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's 
behalf."). 
R Even If Montiel Had Not Preserved His Issue For Appeal, This Court Should 
Still Reverse Because the Trial Court's Abuse of Discretion Was Plain Error. 
The State argues Montiel must meet an enhanced plain error standard because 
abuse of discretion under a plain error argument "'must be much more blatant than the 
garden variety "abuse of discretion" featured in routine appellate review.5" Aple. Br. at 
17 (quoting State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918, 922 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)). However, Stirba 
deals with abuse of discretion not in the context of plain error but in the context of a writ 
for extraordinary relief. See Stirba, 972 P.2d at 922 (Abuse of discretion "for Rule 
65B(d)(2)(A) writs [for extraordinary relief] must be much more blatant than the garden 
variety 'abuse of discretion' featured in routine appellate review." (citing Renn v. Utah 
State Bd. of Pardons. 904 P.2d 677, 683 (Utah 1995) (also addressing writs for 
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extraordinary relief)). In reality, "plain error" itself is the more stringent standard and is 
applied when "abuse of discretion" is not available because the issue was not preserved 
for appeal. See State v. Emmett 839 P.2d 781,785 n. 11 (Utah 1992) (noting need not 
address abuse of discretion because "we address the issue on a plain error standard, 
which is more deferential then [sic] a discretionary standard"); State v. EUifritz, 835 P.2d 
170, 177 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (noting that if defendant had challenged jurors for cause 
standard of review would be abuse of discretion, but because there was no challenge 
court must apply "more stringent standard of plain error"). 
Accordingly, this Court, if it reviews this case for plain error, should apply the 
traditional plain error test. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at ^13 ("To demonstrate plain error, 
a defendant must establish that '(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious 
to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our 
confidence in the verdict is undermined.'" (citation omitted)). Further, as outlined in 
Montiel's opening brief, this Court should reverse because the trial court committed plain 
error by rejecting the plea agreement based solely on its personal bias against firearms. 
SeeAplt. Br. at 25-27. 
C Montiel Did Not Invite the Trial Court's Error. 
"Generally, [this Court] will review objections raised for the first time on appeal 
for plain error." State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted). 
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However, "[i]f a party through counsel has made a conscious decision to refrain from 
objecting or has led the trial court into error, we will then decline to save that party from 
the error." IcL The invited error doctrine "serves two purposes." State v. Anderson, 929 
P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996). '"First, it fortifies our long-established policy that the trial 
court should have the first opportunity to address the claim of error. Second, it 
discourages parties from intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a 
hidden ground for reversal on appeal.5" IdL. (citations omitted). Here, the invited error 
doctrine does not apply because both policy reasons for withholding the doctrine are met. 
First, the trial court was given the opportunity to address and correct its abuse of 
discretion. The invited error doctrine only applies if the defendant affirmatively led the 
trial court into error. See State v. Geukgeuzian, 2002 UT App 130,^|10, 54 P.3d 640 
(holding defendant did not invite error by proposing "'elements instruction containing 
the very omission he complains of on appeal'" because he did not "actually l[ead] the 
trial court into its erroneous action"), cert, granted, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002); State v. 
Samora, 2002 UT App 384,^4, 13, 59 P.3d 604 (holding defendant did not invite error 
by requesting "trial court waive or substantially reduce Defendant's fine so Defendant 
could pay the restitution that he originally agreed to" because colloquy "lacked sufficient 
clarity to construe it as an invitation or stipulation for the trial court to [impose a more 
severe sentence on remand]"), cert, granted, 65 P.3d 1190 (Utah 2003). Here, Montiel 
did not affirmatively lead the trial court into abusing its discretion by applying a blanket 
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policy to reject the plea agreement. R. 200:4-7. Rather, he and the State repeatedly 
attempted to dissuade the trial court from its ruling. See. Section II.A. 
Second, Montiel did not intentionally mislead the trial court into its error to 
preserve a hidden issue for appeal. See Sections I.A.2, II.A; supra n. 3. Instead, Montiel, 
with the State's assistance, urged the trial court to reconsider its abusive fixed policy and 
then continued to defend himself when it became clear the trial court would not 
reconsider its fixed policy. See id. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Montiel's conviction because the trial court abused its 
discretion by rejecting the plea agreement. 
SUBMITTED this at*- day of January, 2004. 
£_ 
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